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ABSTRACT
With the increasing scale of deployment of Internet of Things (IoT),
concerns about IoT security have become more urgent. In particular,
memory corruption attacks play a predominant role as they allow
remote compromise of IoT devices. Control-flow integrity (CFI) is
a promising and generic defense technique against these attacks.
However, given the nature of IoT deployments, existing protection
mechanisms for traditional computing environments (including CFI)
need to be adapted to the IoT setting. In this paper, we describe
the challenges of enabling CFI on microcontroller (MCU) based
IoT devices. We then present CaRE, the first interrupt-aware CFI
scheme for low-end MCUs. CaRE uses a novel way of protecting
the CFI metadata by leveraging TrustZone-M security extensions
introduced in the ARMv8-M architecture. Its binary instrumentation
approach preserves the memory layout of the target MCU software,
allowing pre-built bare-metal binary code to be protected by CaRE.
We describe our implementation on a Cortex-M Prototyping System
and demonstrate that CaRE is secure while imposing acceptable
performance and memory impact.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are becoming pervasive across many
application areas ranging from industrial applications (manufac-
turing), transport, and smart cities to consumer products. Internet
of Things (IoT) refers to systems incorporating such devices with
(typically always-on) communication capability. Estimates put the
number of deployed IoT devices at 28 billion by 2021 [19]. Although
programmable CPS devices are not new, connectivity makes them
targets for network originating attacks. Gartner highlights device
identity (management), code/data integrity and secure communica-
tion as the most important security services for IoT [24].
The system software in IoT devices is often written in memory-
unsafe languages like C [27]. The arms race [49] in runtime ex-
ploitation of general purpose computers and network equipment has
shown us that memory errors, such as buffer overflows and use-after-
free errors, constitute a dominant attack vector for stealing sensitive
data or gaining control of a remote system. Over the years, a num-
ber of platform security techniques to resist such attacks have been
developed and deployed on PCs, servers and mobile devices. These
include protections against code injection and code-reuse attacks,
such as Control-Flow Integrity [3] (CFI) and Address Space Layout
Randomization [12, 36] (ASLR) which aim to ensure the run-time
integrity of a device.
CFI (Section 3.1) is a well-explored technique for resisting
the code-reuse attacks such as Return-Oriented Programming
(ROP) [47] that allow attackers in control of data memory to subvert
the control flow of a program. CFI commonly takes the form of
inlined enforcement, where CFI checks are inserted at points in the
program code where control flow changes occur. For legacy applica-
tions CFI checks must be introduced by instrumenting the pre-built
binary. Such binary instrumentation necessarily modifies the mem-
ory layout of the code, requiring memory addresses referenced by
the program to be adjusted accordingly [28]. This is typically done
through load-time dynamic binary rewriting software [14, 39].
A prominent class of state-of-the-art CFI schemes is based on the
notion of a shadow stack [13]: a mechanism that prevents overwrit-
ing subroutine return addresses on the call stack by comparing each
return address to a protected copy kept in the shadow stack before
performing the return. This effectively mitigates return-oriented pro-
gramming attacks that stitch together instruction sequences ending
in return instructions [47]. However, it presumes the existence of
mechanisms to ensure that the shadow stack cannot be manipulated
by the attacker.
As we argue in detail in Section 3.3, the type of IoT scenarios
we consider have a number of characteristics that make traditional
CFI mechanisms difficult to apply. First, IoT devices are typically
architected as interrupt-driven reactive systems, often implemented
as bare-metal software involving no loading or relocation. To the
best of our knowledge, no existing CFI scheme is interrupt-aware.
Second, IoT devices are often based on computing cores that are
low-cost, low-power single-purpose programmable microcontrollers
(MCUs). Countermeasures for general purpose computing devices,
such as ASLR, often rely on hardware features (e.g., virtual memory)
that are unavailable in simple MCUs. Prior CFI schemes for embed-
ded systems, such as HAFIX [15], and the recently announced Intel
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [31], require changes
to the hardware and toolchain, access to source code and do not
support interrupts.
On the positive side, hardware-based isolation mechanisms for
MCUs have appeared not only in the research literature [17, 18, 32],
but also as commercial offerings such as the recently announced
TrustZone-M security extensions for the next generation of ARM mi-
crocontrollers (Section 2.2) providing a lightweight trust anchor for
resource-constrained IoT devices [5]. However, since software (and
updates) for IoT devices may come from a different source than the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM), it is unrealistic to expect
the software vendors to take responsibility for the instrumentation
necessary for hardware-assisted CFI protection – OEMs in turn will
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be incentivized to distribute the same software to all devices, with
and without hardware security extensions.
Goal and Contributions. We introduce the first hardware soft-
ware co-design based security architecture that (i) enables practical
enforcement of control-flow policies, (ii) addresses the unique chal-
lenges of low-end IoT devices with respect to CFI deployment,
(iii) requires no changes to the underlying hardware, and (iv) oper-
ates directly on binary code thereby avoiding the need for source
code. Specifically, we target control-flow integrity policies that de-
fend against runtime attacks, such as ROP, that belong to the most
prominent software attacks on all modern computing architectures,
e.g., Desktop PCs [47], mobile devices [33], and embedded sys-
tems [21].
To this end we present the design and implementation of a novel
architecture, CaRE (Call and Return Enforcement), accompanied
with a toolchain for achieving robust run-time code integrity for IoT
devices. We claim the following contributions:
• The first interrupt-aware CFI scheme for low-end MCUs
(Section 4) supporting
– hardware-based shadow stack protection by lever-
aging recently introduced TrustZone-M security ex-
tensions (Section 4.2).
– a new binary instrumentation technique that is mem-
ory layout-preserving and can be realized on-device
(Section 4.3).
• An implementation of CaRE on ARM Versatile Express
Cortex-M Prototyping System (Section 4.4).
• A comprehensive evaluation (Section 5) showing that CaRE
ensures CFI (Section 5.1), has a lower performance over-
head (Section 5.2) compared to software-based shadow
stack schemes while imposing comparable impact on pro-
gram binary size (Section 5.3).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 ARM Architecture
ARM microprocessors are RISC-based computer designs that
are widely used in computing systems which benefit from reduced
cost, heat, and power consumption compared to processors found in
personal computers. The ARM architecture is instantiated in three
different classes of processors;
Cortex-A series application processors are deployed in mobile de-
vices, networking equipment and other home and consumer devices.
Cortex-R series real-time processors are deployed in embedded
devices with strict real-time, fault tolerance and availability require-
ments such as wireless baseband processors, mass storage controllers
and safety critical automotive, medical and industrial systems.
Cortex-M series of processors are geared towards embedded mi-
crocontrollers (MCUs) requiring minimal cost and high energy-
efficiency such as sensors, wearables and robotics. Some Cortex-M
chips integrate Digital Signal Processing (DSP) and accelerated
floating point processing capability for improved power efficiency
in digital signal control applications.
The current family of Cortex-M processors features five distinct
CPUs, ranging from the low power and energy efficient M0 and M0+
(based on the ARMv6-M architecture) to the higher performance M3,
M4 and M7 CPUs (based on the ARMv7-M architecture). All these
CPUs utilize a mixed 16-bit / 32-bit instruction set (see Thumb in-
struction set below) and use 32-bit addressing exclusively. The latest
generation of the M-class processor architectures, ARMv8-M [5, 52],
is further divided into two subprofiles; ARMv8-M Baseline for pro-
cessor designs with a low gate count and a simpler instruction set
(replacing the ARMv6-M architecture), and ARMv8-M Mainline
for high performance embedded systems that demand complex data
processing (replacing the ARMv7-M architecture).
Table 1 shows examples of ARM-based IoT devices together
with their respective processor and memory specifications. In this
paper, we focus primarily on devices in the low end of this device
spectrum, i.e., constrained MCUs (up-to Cortex-M7 equivalent) in
single-purpose IoT devices, where memory and storage are at a pre-
mium. The ARM9, ARM11 and Cortex-A -based devices in Table 1
typically run general purpose operating systems where the kernel
security architecture can employ numerous access control and en-
forcement mechanisms, such as memory isolation and access control
on virtual system resources. In contrast the devices we focus on lack
a Memory Management Unit (MMU) and the role of the Operat-
ing System (OS) is reduced to basic scheduling tasks. Rudimentary
isolation capabilities between distinct software components may be
provided through the presence of a Memory Protection Unit (MPU),
in which case the configuration of the MPU is tasked to the OS.
All 32-bit ARM processors feature 16 general-purpose registers,
denoted r0-r15. Registers r13-r15 have special names and us-
age models. Table 2 lists each register and its corresponding usage
model. These registers, including the program counter (pc) can be
accessed directly. Cortex-M processors implement two stacks, the
Main stack and Process stack. The stack pointer (sp) is banked
between processor modes, i.e., multiple copies of a register exists
in distinct register banks. Not all registers can be seen at once; the
register bank in use is determined by the current processor mode.
Register banking allows for rapid context switches when dealing
with processor exceptions and privileged operations. Application
software on Cortex-M processor executes in Thread mode where
the current stack is determined by the stack-pointer select (spsel)
register. When the processor executes an exception it enters the Han-
dler mode. In Handler mode the processors always uses the Main
stack.
The Combined Program Status Register xpsr is a 32-bit special
purpose register that is a combination of the logical Application
(apsr), Execution (epsr), and Interrupt (ipsr) Program Status
Registers. The apsr contains status bits accessible to application-
level software. The epsr contains the execution state bit which
describes the instruction set, which on Cortex-M CPUs is only set to
Thumb mode. When executing in Handler mode, the ipsr holds the
exception number of the exception being handled. The ipsr may
only be read using a mrs instruction used to access ARM system
registers, and is only updated by the processor itself on exception
entry and exit (see Exception behaviour in Section 4.4). Table 3
provides a non-exhaustive list of special registers and their usage.
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Table 1: Comparison between some contemporary 32-bit ARM IoT-related devices
Device Cores × Clock RAM Flash Processor
Kionix Sensor Hub 1 32 MHz 16 KB 128 KB KX23H-1035 (ARM Cortex-M0)
Polar V800 watch 2 180 MHz 256 KB 2 MB STM 32F437 (ARM Cortex-M4)
Atmel in-vehicle entertainment 3
300 MHz 384 KB 2 MB ATSAMV71Q21 (ARM Cortex-M7)
remote audio amplifier
Nintento 3DS 4 2 × 268 MHz
128MB 1000MB
ARM11MPCore (ARM11)
handheld video game console 134 MHz ARM946 (ARM9)
Raspberry Pi Zero 5 1100 MHz 512 MB External BCM2835 (ARM11)
Samsung Galaxy S4 6 4 × 1600 MHz
2 GB 16 / 32 GB Exynos 5410 Octa
(ARM Cortex-A15)
smartphone 4 × 1200 MHz (ARM Cortex-A7)
Table 2: ARM General Purpose Registers [4]
Register Usage model
r0 - r3 Argument / scratch register
r4 - r8 Variable register (callee saved)
r9 Platform register
r10 - r11 Variable register (callee saved)
r12 (ip) Intra-Procedure-call scratch register
r13 (sp) Stack Pointer
r14 (lr) Link Register (subroutine return address)
r15 (pc) Program Counter
Table 3: ARM Special Purpose Registers [5]
Register Usage model
spsel Stack-Pointer Select Register
xpsr Combined Program Status Register
apsr Application Program Status Register
epsr Execution Program Status Register
ipsr Interrupt Program Status Register
The Thumb instruction set. ARM Cortex-M series processors
utilize the Thumb instruction set, which is a subset of common
commands found in the 32-bit RISC instruction set used in more
powerful ARM Cortex-A series of application processors. Thumb
is a fixed-length 16-bit instruction set, where each instruction is
a compact shorthand for an instruction found among 32-bit ARM
instructions. Encoding a program in thumb code is around 25% more
size-efficient than its corresponding 32-bit encoding. Modern ARM
processors extend the Thumb instruction set with 32-bit instructions,
e.g. to achieve a larger range or relative branch destinations. These
new instructions are distinct from those used in the 32-bit ARM
instruction set, and may be intermixed with 16-bit Thumb instruc-
tions. The resulting variable-length instruction set is referred to as
1http://www.kionix.com/product/KX23H-1035
2https://community.arm.com/groups/wearables/blog/2015/01/05/
a-closer-look-at-some-of-the-latest-arm-based-wearables
3http://www.atmel.com/applications/automotive/infotainment-hmi-connectivity/
audio-amplifier.aspx
4https://3dbrew.org/wiki/Hardware
5https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/pi-zero/
6http://www.gsmarena.com/samsung_i9500_galaxy_s4-5125.php
Thumb-27. Unlike the 32-bit ARM instructions, which are encoded
as 32-bit words, 32-bit Thumb-2 instructions are encoded as two
consecutive 16-bit half-words. The improved code density compared
to the 32-bit ARM instruction set makes Thumb better suited for
embedded systems where code footprint is often an important con-
sideration due to restricted memory bandwidth and memory cost.
On ARM application cores, both 32-bit ARM and variable length
Thumb instruction sets are supported and interwork freely. Cortex-M
processors only support Thumb and Thumb-2 instructions. Attempts
to change the instruction execution state to 32 bit mode causes a
processor exception.
ARM calling standard. As with all processors, ARM provides a
calling standard that compiler manufacturers should use to resolve
subroutine calls and returns in an interchangeable manner. In pro-
grams conforming to the ARM Architecture Procedure Call Standard
(AAPCS) [4] subroutine calls may be performed either through a
Branch with Link (bl) or Branch with Link and eXchange (blx) in-
struction. These instructions load the address of the subroutine to the
pc and the return address to the link register (lr). ARM processors
do not provide a dedicated return instruction. Instead, a subroutine
return is performed by writing the return address to the program
counter pc. Hence, any instruction that can write to the pc can be
leveraged as an effective return instruction. Two common effective
return instructions are bx lr and pop {..., pc}. The bx lr
instruction performs a branch to the return address stored in the link
register lr. The pop {..., pc} in a subroutine epilogue loads
the return address from the stack to the pc. The former is typically
used in leaf routines, which do not execute procedure calls to other
routines. The latter is typically preceded by a push {..., lr}
instruction in the subroutine prologue, which in a non-leaf routine
stores the return address in lr (possibly along with other registers
that need to be saved) on the stack in preparation for calls to other
routines.
2.2 TrustZone-M
TrustZone-M [5, 52] (TZ-M) is a new hardware security technol-
ogy present in the ARMv8-M architecture. In terms of functionality,
it replicates the properties of processor supported isolation and prior-
ity execution provided by TrustZone-enabled Cortex-A application
7For the remainder of this article, we use the terms Thumb and Thumb-2 interchangeably
when referring to machine code that may contain both 16-bit Thumb and 32-bit Thumb-2
instructions.
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Figure 2: ARMv8-M registers [52]
processors (TZ-A), but their respective architectural realizations
differ significantly. Both TZ architectures expose a set of secure
state non-privileged and privileged processor contexts beside their
traditional non-secure state counterparts8. In both TZ variants the
memory management is extended to enable splitting the device’s
physical memory into secure and non-secure regions. Fig. 1 shows
the relationship between the traditional Thread and Handler modes
(on the left hand side) and their new secure state counterparts.
In TZ-M, the only general purpose registers banked between the
non-secure and secure states are the sp registers used to address
the Main and Process stacks. Fig. 2 illustrates the set of registers
in a ARMv8-M equipped with TZ-M. The MSP_ns and PSP_ns
represent the Main and Process stack pointer in non-secure state,
whereas the MSP_s and PSP_s represent the corresponding stack
pointers in secure state. The remaining general purpose registers
are shared (not banked) between the non-secure and secure states.
In practice this means that the secure state software is responsible
for sanitizing any sensitive information held in any general purpose
registers during a transition from secure to non-secure state9.
In TZ-A the entry to the secure state occurs via a dedicated hard-
ware exception and the context switch is performed by the exception
handler known as the Secure Monitor. In TZ-M the division between
the secure and non-secure states is instead based on a memory map
set up during device initialization which assigns specific regions
of memory as either secure or non-secure. The transitions between
secure and non-secure state occur automatically as the flow of exe-
cution is transferred from program code in non-secure memory to
secure memory (and vice versa). Where in TZ-A the entry into the
8Also referred to as the secure world and normal world.
9In addition any registers denoted callee save in the AAPCS [4] must be stored and
restored by the secure state software upon secure state entry and exit respectively.
secure state typically has to manage VM and MMU configuration
at the expense of thousands of processor cycles, TZ-M is geared
towards embedded processors with no virtual memory support (at
most a MPU). In TZ-M a switch of security state only takes a few
processor cycles including a pipeline flush [52].
The hardware support for the division of memory into secure and
non-secure regions in ARMv8-M is a Secure Attribution Unit (SAU)
inside the processor. The SAU is configurable while the processor
executes in secure state. External interrupts may be routed to ei-
ther non-secure state exception handlers, or secure state exception
handlers based on the SAU configuration. Fig. 3 denotes a typical
memory layout for a TZ-M equipped device. Each memory region
known to the SAU may be declared as either Non-Secure (❶), Se-
cure (❷) or Secure Non-Secure Callable (NSC ❸). While Secure
memory contains the secure program image and data, the NSC mem-
ory contains secure gateway veneers10, i.e., branch instructions (❼)
which point to the actual subroutine code in Secure memory (❹).
The purpose of the NSC is to prevent non-secure program code to
branch into invalid entry points in secure program code (such as into
the middle of a function, as is often done in atleast ROP). To this
end, the ARMv8-M instruction set also introduces a Secure Gateway
(sg) instruction, which is included in the beginning of each veneer
(❻) and acts as a call gate to the secure program code. From the non-
secure program code a call to a secure subroutine is performed using
a regular bl instruction (❺), targeting the corresponding veneer in
the NSC. Calls targeting a memory address in the NSC will automat-
ically cause a context switch to secure state, and the processor will
validate that the call targets a valid entry point with a sg instruction.
In particular, calls from non-secure state calling secure memory
outside the NSC, or non-sg instructions in the NSC will fail in a
Secure Fault, a new type of hardware exception which always traps
into secure state. Secure subroutines return by executing a bxns
lr instruction (❽), which otherwise behaves like a return through
bx lr, but additionally switches the processor to non-secure state.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 Code-Reuse Attacks on ARM
Code-reuse attacks are a class of software exploits that allow
attackers to execute arbitrary code on a compromised device, even
in the presence of hardware countermeasures against code injection,
such as W⊕X [29]. In a return-to-libc attack [48], the subroutine
return address on the call stack is replaced by the address of an
entry point to a subroutine in the executable memory of a process.
The technique has been generalized into Return-Oriented Program-
ming [47] (ROP) for the x86 architecture, which has since become
the exploitation technique of choice for modern memory-safety vul-
nerability attacks. Subsequently ROP has been extended to various
other CPU architectures [7, 10, 21], including ARM microproces-
sors [33].
In a ROP attack, the attacker arranges the call stack to point to
short sequences of instructions in the executable memory of the
victim program. The instruction sequences, commonly referred to as
gadgets, are chosen so that each ends in a return instruction, (i.e., a
pop {..., pc} or bx lr in the ARM architecture) which, as
10http://www.keil.com/support/man/docs/armclang_link/armclang_link_
pge1444644885613.htm
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Figure 3: ARMv8-M secure state call [52]
long as the attacker has control of the return address, causes each
gadget to be executed in sequence. The crucial advancement of ROP
compared to return-to-libc attacks is that, given a suitable set of
gadgets, Turing complete code execution without code injection can
be achieved. Hence, a standard result in ROP work is to show the
presence of a Turing complete set of gadgets in the victim program
executable memory [7, 10, 21, 33, 47]. Usually such a set of gadgets
is sought from a commonly used shared library, such as libc or stan-
dard Windows DLLs, to demonstrate the applicability of the attack
in arbitrary programs that link to this standard library. However, it
should also be noted that a great deal of work prior to 2007 shows
that even without a Turing complete gadget set, it is possible to
leverage control of the stack to manipulate program execution in
meaningful ways [34, 41, 51].
Many code-reuse attacks on x86 platforms use unintended in-
struction sequences found by performing a branch into the middle
of otherwise benign instructions. Such unintended sequences cannot
be formed in the 32-bit ARM, or in the 16-bit Thumb instruction
sets where branch target alignment is enforced on instruction load,
and hence may only target the intended instruction stream. However,
the presence of both 32-bit and 16-bit instructions in Thumb-2 code
introduces ambiguity when decoding program code from memory.
When decoding Thumb-2 instructions, ARM processors still enforce
2-byte alignment on instruction fetches, but the variable-length en-
coding allows the second half-word in a 32-bit Thumb-2 instruction
to be interpreted as the first half-word of an unintended instruction.
Such unintended instructions have been successfully utilized in prior
work [37, 38] to exploit ARM code.
Various proposed defenses against ROP have attempted to lever-
age properties of the gadgets executed during a ROP attack. The
attacks alter the program flow in at least two ways: 1) they contain
many return instructions, occurring only a few instructions apart,
and 2) the returns unwind the call stack without a corresponding
subroutine call.
It has been shown that, on both x86 and ARM, it is also possible
to perform ROP attacks without the use of return instructions [9]
in what has become to be known as Jump-Oriented Programming
(JOP). On ARM platforms, JOP can be instantiated using indirect
subroutine calls.
3.2 Control-Flow Integrity
A well known approach to address code-reuse attacks is enforcing
the Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) of the code. The execution of any
program can be abstractly represented as a Control-Flow Graph
(CFG), where nodes represent blocks of sequental instructions (with-
out intervening branches), and edges represent control-flow changes
between such nodes (branch instructions). CFI enforcement strives
to ensure that the execution of the programs conforms to a legiti-
mate path in the program’s CFG. CFI builds on the assumption that
program code in memory is not writable (i.e., that memory pages
can be marked W⊕X) as a countermeasure against code injection
attacks. Code immutability allows CFI checks to be omitted for
nodes in the CFG that end in direct branch instructions [3, 20], i.e.,
branches with a statically determined target offset. As a result, CFI is
typically applied to nodes in the CFG that end in an indirect branch.
Indirect branches are typically emitted for switch-case statements,
subroutine returns, and indirect calls (subroutine calls to dynamic
libraries, calls through function pointers, e.g. callbacks, as well as
C++ virtual functions).
While the construction of the CFG can occur through static in-
spection of the program binary, the actual enforcement of CFI must
occur at runtime. In inlined CFI enforcement the checks that validate
control-flow changes are interspersed with the original program code
at subroutine call sites, as well as in the subroutine prologue and
epilogue11. The insertion of these checks can be achieved through
compiler extensions [11], or by binary machine-code rewriting. Bi-
nary instrumentation that adds additional instructions to a pre-built
program binary by necessity modifies the memory layout of the code,
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and hence will require memory addresses referenced by the program
to be adjusted accordingly.
Traditional ROP targets return instructions that read the return
address off the program stack. A well known technique to enforce
that subroutine returns target the original call site is the notion of
a shadow call stack [3, 8, 11, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31, 40, 45].
The shadow call stack is used to hold a copy of the return address.
On subroutine return the return address on the shadow call stack is
compared to the return address on the program stack. If they match,
the return proceeds as usual. A mismatch in return addresses on the
other hand indicates a failure of CFI and triggers an error which
terminates the program prematurely. Recent results show that, in
fact, shadow stacks are essential for the security of CFI [8].
3.3 CFI Challenges for Microcontrollers
We identify the following challenges in realizing CFI protection
on IoT devices:
• Interrupt awareness: Since the software to be protected
is a single, interrupt-driven bare-metal program, the CFI
scheme needs to handle both interruptible code, as well as
execution in interrupt contexts. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no existing CFI scheme meets this requirement.
• Hardware-based shadow stack protection: Protection of
shadow stack must leverage lightweight hardware-based
trust anchors like TrustZone-M. The code size and perfor-
mance overhead of purely software-based CFI is prohibitive
on resource constrained devices and techniques for general
purpose computing devices often rely on hardware (such as
x86 segmentation support [3]) that is unavailable in simple
MCUs.
• Layout-preserving instrumentation: Since software for
MCUs is commonly deployed as monolithic firmware im-
ages with strict size requirements, CFI instrumentation
must preserve memory layout of the image so as to avoid
extensive rewriting and to minimize the increase in code
size.
• On-device instrumentation: To avoid having to rely on
the developer (or some other external entity) to perform
the required instrumentation, the CFI scheme must be
amenable to on-device instrumentation.
3.4 Adversarial Model
We consider a powerful adversary with arbitrary read-access to
code memory and arbitrary read-write access to data memory of the
non-secure state program. This model accounts for buffer overflows
or other memory-related vulnerabilities (e.g. an externally controlled
format string12) that, in practice, would allow adversaries to gain
such capabilities. The adversary cannot modify code memory, a
property that is achievable even on MCU class systems through
widespread countermeasure against code injection (e.g. MPU-based
W⊕X). Nevertheless, arbitrary read-access necessitates a solution
that is able to withstand information disclosure (the strongest attack
11The subroutine prologue is a compiler generated sequence of instructions in the
beginning of each subroutine which prepares the stack and registers for use within
the subroutine. Similarly, the subroutine epilogue appears at the end of the subroutine,
which restores the stack and registers to the state prior to the subroutine call.
scenario in Dang et al.’s [13] evaluation of prior work on CFI). Our
threat model is therefore similar to previous work on CFI, but we
also consider an even stronger adversary who can exploit interrupt
handling to undermine CFI protection.
This model applies even when an attacker is in active control
of a module or thread within the same address space as the non-
secure state program, such as gaining control of an unprotected
co-processor on the System-On-Chip (SoC). However, the adversary
lacks the ability to read or modify memory allocated to the secure
state software.
In this work, we do not consider non-control data attacks [49]
such as Data-Oriented Programming [30]. This class of attacks can
achieve privilege escalation, leak security sensitive data or even
Turing-complete computation by corrupting memory variables that
are not directly used in control-flow transfer instructions. This limi-
tation also applies to prior work on CFI.
4 CFI CARE
We now present CaRE (Call and Return Enforcement), our solution
for ensuring control-flow integrity. CaRE specifically targets con-
strained IoT devices, which are expected to stay active in the field
for a prolonged time and operate unattended with network (Internet)
connectivity, possibly via IoT gateways. This kind of deployment
necessitates the incorporation of software update mechanisms to fix
vulnerabilities, update configuration settings and add new function-
ality.
We limit our scope to small, more or less bare-metal IoT devices.
The system software is deployed as monolithic, statically linked
firmware images. The secure and non-secure state program images
are distinct from each other [2], with the secure state software stack
structured as a library. The configuration of the SAU and the secure
state program image is performed before the non-secure code is
started. The entry to the secure state library happens through a well-
defined interface describing the call gates available to non-secure
software. Functions in the secure state are synchronous and run
to completion unless interrupted by an exception. The system is
interrupt-driven, reacting to external triggers. While it is possible
that the non-secure state software is scheduled by a simple Real-
Time Operating System (RTOS), the secure state software does not
have separate scheduling or isolation between distinct software com-
ponents for the simple reason that the device is single-purpose rather
than a platform for running many programs from many stakeholders
in parallel. Even when an RTOS is present, it is seldom necessary
for non-secure state code to support dynamic loading of additional
code sequences.
4.1 Requirements
Given the above target deployment scenario, we formulate the fol-
lowing requirements that CaRE should meet:
REQUIREMENT 1. It must reliably prevent attacks from redirect-
ing the flow of execution of the non-secure state program.
REQUIREMENT 2. It must be able to protect system software
written in standard C and assembler conformant to the AAPCS.
12CWE-134: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/134.html
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REQUIREMENT 3. It must have minimal impact on the code
footprint of the non-secure state program.
REQUIREMENT 4. Its performance overhead must be competitive
compared to the overhead of software-based CFI schemes.
We make the following assumptions about the target device:
ASSUMPTION 1. A trust anchor, such as TZ-M, which enables
isolated code execution and secure storage of data at runtime is
available.
ASSUMPTION 2. All (secure and non-secure) code is subject
to a secure boot sequence that prevents tampering of program and
update images at rest. This bootstrap sequence itself is not vulnerable
to code-reuse attacks, and routines in the bootstrap code are not
invoked again after the device startup completes.
ASSUMPTION 3. All code is non-writable. It must not be possible
for an attacker to modify the program code in memory at runtime.
ASSUMPTION 4. All data is non-executable. It must not be pos-
sible for an attacker to execute data as it were code. Otherwise, an
attacker will be able to mount code injection attacks against the
device.
Assumption 1 is true for commercial off-the-shelf ARMv8-M
MCUs. There also exist several research architectures, such as
SMART [18], SANCUS [43], and Intel’s TrustLite [32] that provide
equivalent features. Assumption 2 is true for currently announced
ARMv8-M SoCs 13. Assumptions 3 and 4 are in line with previous
work on CFI and can be easily achieved on embedded devices that
are equipped with MPUs. These assumptions can be problematic in
the presence of self-modifying code, runtime code generation, and
unanticipated dynamic loading of code. Fortunately, most embedded
system software in MCUs is typically statically linked and written in
languages that compile directly to native code. Even when an RTOS
is present, it is seldom necessary for non-secure state code to support
dynamic loading of additional code sequences.
4.2 Architecture
Our design incorporates protection of a shadow call stack on low-
end ARM embedded devices featuring TZ-M. The shadow call stack
resides in secure memory, and is only accessible when the processor
executes in the secure state. We also propose a layout-preserving
binary instrumentation approach for Thumb code, with small impact
to code footprint, and an opportunity for on-device instrumentation
as part of code installation. The main aspect of this property is that
the binary program image is rewritten without affecting its memory
layout. Fig. 4 shows an overview of the CaRE architecture.
The premise for CaRE is instrumentation of non-secure state code
in a manner which removes all function calls and indirect branches
and replaces them with dispatch instructions that trap control flow
to a piece of monitor code, the Branch Monitor (❶), which runs
in non-secure state. As a result, each subroutine call and return
is now routed through the Branch Monitor. The Branch Monitor
maintains the shadow stack by invoking secure functions (❷) only
callable from the Branch Monitor, before transferring control to the
13https://www.embedded-world.de/en/ausstellerprodukte/embwld17/
product-9863796/numicro-m2351-series-microcontroller
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Figure 4: CaRE overview
original branch target. Other indirect branches, such as ones used to
branch into switch case jump tables can be restricted by the Branch
Monitor to a suitable range and to target direct branches in jump
table entries. Thus, the Branch Monitor provides complete mediation
of instrumented non-secure state code.
Apart from the Branch Monitor, the program image also contains
bootstrap routines (labeled bn) that are used to initialize the run-
time environment (❸). Such routines may initially need to operate
without a stack and other memory structures in place, and as such
are typically hand written in assembler. Due to these constraints,
the bootstrap routines are likely to deviate from usual AAPCS con-
ventions. In particular, all calls are not guaranteed to result in a
subsequent matching return as fragments of bootstrap routines may
simply be chained together until eventually transferring control to
the named C entry point marking the beginning of main program
code. On the other hand, the initialization code is typically not en-
tered again after control has been transfered to the main function
until the device is reset.
Hence, from the perspective of maintaining control-flow integrity,
both the Branch Monitor and bootstrap code exist outside benign
execution paths encountered in the program during normal opera-
tion. Henceforth, we will refer to the code reachable from the main
function as the main program. The CFG nodes labeled fn in Fig. 4
represent the instrumented main program (❹). The main program
and bootstrap code do not share any routines (Assumption 2), even
though routines belonging to one or the other may be interleaved in
program memory. The main program code constitutes a strongly con-
nected component within the call graph14. This observation leads us
to consider the main program code as a complete ensemble in terms
of instrumentation target. It can include an RTOS and/or interrupt
handlers. Interrupts handlers labeled hn (❺), with the exception of
the supervisor call handler that hosts the Branch Monitor, are con-
sidered to be part of the main program. Conceptually, interrupts may
be reached from any node in the program’s CFG.
By eliminating non-mediated calls and returns in the non-secure
state main program, thus forcing each indirect branch through the
Branch Monitor, we can unequivocally eliminate control-flow at-
tacks that utilize such branches.
14A call graph is a control-flow graph which represents the calling relationships between
subroutines in a program.
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4.3 Instrumentation
The instrumentation must intercept all subroutine calls and returns.
Furthermore, it should have minimal impact on code footprint. Prior
shadow stack schemes either instrument the subroutine prologue and
epilogue [11, 13], or the call site [13], pushing the return address to
the shadow stack upon a subroutine call, and validating the return
address on top of the shadow stack upon return. We propose an
alternative approach which is layout-preserving.
In uninstrumented code, the target address of direct subroutine
calls (i.e., bl instructions with immediate operands) are encoded as
pc-relative offsets (i.e., signed integer values). In other words, the
destination address depends on the location of the branch instruction
in memory. During instrumentation, we calculate the absolute des-
tination address, and store it in a data structure, called the branch
table which at runtime resides in read-only non-secure memory.
Each destination address in this branch table is indexed by the mem-
ory address of the original branch instruction. The original branch
instruction is overwritten with a dispatch instruction, which, when
executed, traps into the Branch Monitor. At runtime, whenever an
instruction rewritten in this fashion traps into the Branch Monitor,
the Branch Monitor will lookup the destination address from the
branch table, and redirect control flow to the original destination
address.
In a similar manner, indirect branches corresponding to calls and
effective returns are replaced with dispatch instructions. The destina-
tion address of the branches are only known at runtime, determined
by a register value (lr in the case of effective returns), or by a return
address stored on the program call stack, and hence do not influence
the construction of the branch table during instrumentation.
To address JOP attacks, our CFI enforcement must also be able to
determine legal call targets for indirect calls. In the case of indirect
subroutine calls, the call target must be a valid entry point to the
destination subroutine, i.e., the call must target the beginning of
the subroutine prologue. The entry addresses are extracted from the
symbol information emitted by the compiler for debug purposes.
Further restriction of call targets is possible by means of static or
dynamic analysis (see Section 6). Since CaRE only requires the
addresses of entry points, not the full debug information, the entry
points are included in the software image in a call target table on
the device in a similar manner to the branch table. When an indirect
call occurs, the Branch Monitor will match the branch target against
this record of valid subroutine entry points.
In our implementation, we use the supervisor call svc instruc-
tion as the dispatch instruction, and place the Branch Monitor in
the supervisor call exception handler. The svc instruction has a
number of desirable properties which make it suitable as a dispatch.
Firstly, it allows for an 8-bit comment field, which is ignored by
hardware, but can be interpreted in software, typically to determine
the service requested. We exploit this comment field to identify the
type of the original instruction, overwritten during the instrumen-
tation (e.g. bl, blx, pop {pc} etc.). Secondly, the supervisor
call handler executes at the highest exception priority, allowing us
to pre-empt execution to the Branch Monitor when instrumenting
exception handlers. Lastly, because the svc in Thumb instruction
is a 16-bit instruction, it can be used for instrumenting both 32-bit
and 16-bit instructions. When replacing 32-bit instructions, e.g., a
Thumb-2 bl instruction with an immediate operand, we use the
sequence 0xb000, which corresponds to the opcode for add sp,
#0 (effectively a NOP) as padding to fill the remaining 16 bits of
the original bl.
4.4 Implementation
We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of CaRE on the ARM
Versatile Express Cortex-M Prototyping System MPS2+ configured
as a Cortex-M23 CPU.15.
We implemented a binary rewriter to perform the instrumentation
on non-secure state binaries. It utilizes the Capstone disassembly
engine16 to identify control-flow instructions for rewriting.
Fig. 5 illustrates the altered control-flow changes. When a dis-
patch instruction is encountered in the program (❶), instead of taking
a control-flow transfer directly to the original target (❷), program
execution is temporarily halted by a trap into the Branch Monitor
(❸). The Branch Monitor will update the shadow stack maintained
in secure memory by invoking secure shadow stack operations en-
try points in the gateway veneer (❹), which allow access to the
secure state subroutines handling the actual update (❺). Upon com-
pletion, control is returned to the non-secure Branch Monitor code
(❻), which finally redirects control flow to the intended destination
(❼). The same sequence applies both for calls, and returns (❽).
Branch Monitor. The Branch Monitor is responsible for dispatch-
ing and validating control-flow transfers that occur during program
execution. When invoked, it will first determine the reason for the
trap based on the svc comment and trigger the corresponding branch
handler routine within the Branch Monitor. The routine updates the
shadow stack accordingly (pushes return address on subroutine calls,
pops and validates return address on subroutine returns) and redirects
the control flow to the intended target. For branches corresponding
to direct subroutine calls a branch table lookup is needed since the
target of a call is not anymore evident from the dispatch instruction.
For indirect calls, the Branch Monitor verifies that each call targets
a valid subroutine entry within the main program by looking up the
target from the call target table.
As the Branch Monitor executes in the supervisor call handler, the
main stack contains a context state stack frame corresponding to the
processor state at the point the supervisor call exception was taken
(see Table 4). Control-flow redirection is triggered by manipulating
stored pc and lr values in the context stack frame and performing
an exception return from the Branch Monitor (see below), which
causes the processor to restore the context stack frame and resume
execution from the address in the stored pc.
Interrupt awareness. An important feature of M-class cores is
their deterministic interrupt latency in part attributable to the fact
that the context-switch, while entering the exception handler, is
performed entirely in hardware. An instruction that triggers an ex-
ception, such as the svc used for supervisor calls, causes 1) the
hardware to save the current execution context state onto a stack
15We also tested our prototype on the CMSDK_ARMv8MBL FastModel emulator
included in version 1.3.0 of the Cortex Microcontroller Software Development Kit in
Keil µVision version 5.20.0.0. The prototype uses the version 5.0.0-Beta4 of the Cortex
Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS). Binaries for instrumentation
were produced using ArmClang v6.4 included in MDK-ARM version 5.20.
16http://www.capstone-engine.org/
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Table 4: Context state stack frame layout [5]
Offset Stack Contents
0x1C xpsr
0x18 pc
0x14 lr
0x10 r12
0x0C r3
0x08 r2
0x04 r1
0x00 r0 ← sp
pointed to by one of the sp registers, 2) the ipsr to be updated
with the number of the taken exception, and 3) the processor to
switch into Handler mode in which exceptions are taken. Table 4
shows the layout of a typical stack frame created during exception
entry17. The value stored at offset 0x18 in the stack frame is the
pc value at the point the exception was taken, and represents the
return value from which program execution shall continue after the
exception handler exits. To facilitate fast restoration of the saved
context state, M-class processors support a special return sequence
which restores the saved values on the stack into their corresponding
registers. This sequence is known as an exception return and occurs
when the processor is in Handler mode, and a special Exception
Return Value (ERV) is loaded into the pc either via a pop instruc-
tion, or a bx with any register. ERVs are of the form 0xFXXXXXXX,
and encode in their lower-order bits information about the current
processor state and state before the current exception was taken.
ERVs are not interpreted as memory addresses, but are intercepted
by the processor as they are written to the pc. When this occurs,
the processor will validate that there is an exception currently being
handled, and that its number matches the exception number in the
ipsr. If the exception numbers match, the processor performs an
exception return to the processor mode specified by the ERV, restor-
ing the previous register state from the current stack, including the
stored pc. This causes the processor to continue execution from the
point in the program at which the exception was originally taken.
When multiple exceptions are pending, lower priority exceptions
may be tail-chained which causes the processor to directly begin
executing the next pending exception, without restoring the context
state frame between exceptions.
Due to the fact that the context state stack frame contains a stored
pc value that is restored on exception return, an exception handler
with a vulnerability that allows an attacker to control the content
of the context state frame on the stack constitutes a valid attack
vector. This attack differs from a traditional ROP attack in that the
attacker does not need to control the immediate lr value (which
may reside only in the lr register), as during the execution of the
exception handler lr contains merely the current ERV value. Instead,
by manipulating the pc value in the context state stack frame, an
attacker can cause an effective return from the exception handler to
17In Cortex-M processors that implement the floating point extensions, the context stack
frame may also contain the values of floating point registers.
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an arbitrary address. To avoid this, CaRE needs to be interrupt aware,
and accurately record the correct return address for the exception
handler onto the shadow stack. However, exceptions (when enabled)
may be triggered by events external to the main program execution,
effectively pre-empting the main program at an arbitrary position
in the code, even during the execution of another exception handler
(assuming an exception of higher priority arriving concurrently).
To tackle this challenge this, we introduce exception trampolines.
When an exception is received, the trampoline determines the re-
turn address, stores it on the shadow stack, and then proceeds to
execute the original exception handler. The exception trampolines
can be instrumented in place by rewriting the non-secure state ex-
ception vector and replacing the address of each exception with the
address of a corresponding exception trampoline, that ends in a fixed
branch to the original exception handler. That address is the original
exception vector entry.
Since CaRE may interrupt the execution of another exception han-
dler, we need to support a nested exception return, i.e. when the pc is
being supplied with two consecutive return values in immediate suc-
cession. However, pc values in the 0xF0000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF
range are only recognized as ERVs when they are loaded to the
pc either via a pop instruction, or a bx with any register (see Sec-
tion 2.1). In particular, when an ERV is loaded to the pc as part of
an exception return, it is instead interpreted as a memory address in
an inaccessible range thus causing a hard fault in the processor. To
overcome this, we also deploy return trampolines, small fragments
of instruction sequences that contain the different effective return
instructions originally present in the program image prior to binary
rewriting. When the Branch Monitor returns from the supervisor call
exception handler, it does so via the trampoline corresponding to the
original return instruction. APPENDIX A contains an excerpt from
the Branch Monitor, which illustrates the update of the pc and the
lr through the stored context state frame and exception return via
return trampolines.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Security Considerations
A key consideration for the effectiveness of CaRE is the ability of the
Branch Monitor to perform complete mediation of indirect control-
flow events in untrusted non-secure state program code. After all,
any branch instruction for which an adversary can control the desti-
nation may potentially be used to disrupt the normal operation of the
program. In practice, it is not possible to completely eliminate all in-
structions that may act as indirect branches from the non-secure state
program image. In particular, the bootstrap code, the Branch Mon-
itor itself and the return trampolines must remain uninstrumented.
We argue that despite the Branch Monitor and bootstrap code being
uninstrumented, CaRE is secure in terms of fulfilling Requirement 1.
We demonstrate this with the following reasoning.
CLAIM. In order to maintain the control-flow integrity of the
non-secure state program it is sufficient for the Branch Monitor to
mediate calls that occur within the strongly connected component of
the main program’s call graph.
We base our reasoning on the following observations:
OBSERVATION 1. The secure state software stack, and the
Branch Monitor are trusted and cannot be disabled or modified.
This follows from Assumptions 2 and 3. A secure boot mechanism
protects the program code at rest and read-only memory protects it
from modification at runtime.
OBSERVATION 2. The main program has been instrumented in
a manner which replaces all subroutine calls and indirect branch
instructions with Branch Monitor calls.
This follows simply from the operation of our instrumentation.
Based on these observations we formulate the following invariants:
INVARIANT 1. Each subroutine within the main program has
a fixed entry address that is the entry point for all control-transfer
instructions (that are not returns) that branch to the subroutine.
INVARIANT 2. All control-transfer instructions in the main pro-
gram that act as effective returns target a previously executed call
site within the main program.
Invariant 1 is true for all subroutines that are entered by control-
transfer instructions where the destination address is an immediate
operand that is encoded into the machine code instruction itself. This
remains true after instrumentation as per Observation 1 and 2, as the
destinations addresses are replicated read-only in the branch table,
and the control-flow transfer for instrumented calls is mediated by
the Branch Monitor. The entry address to an interrupt handler is the
address recorded in the interrupt vector, and thus fixed, as interrupt
handlers are not called directly from main program code.
As long as Invariant 1 holds control-flow transfers to an offset
from the beginning of a subroutine are not possible. This includes
branches that target 32-bit Thumb-2 instructions at a 16-bit off-
set18, thus attempting to make use of the ambiguity in the Thumb-2
instruction set encoding.
Invariant 2 follows during benign execution from the structure
of the program’s call graph and Assumption 2. It remains true after
instrumentation, notably even in the case the return addresses are
compromised, because Observations 1, 2 and Invariant 1 imply that
the Branch Monitor has complete mediation of control-flow transfers
within the main program. Thus, the Branch Monitor has the ability to
enforce that no return may target an address from which a matching
call site has not been observed.
Based on this, and given that no instrumented subroutine call
will neither ever occur from the bootstrap code nor from the Branch
Monitor into the main program we may formulate the following
corollaries:
COROLLARY 5.1. No return within the main program may target
the Branch Monitor.
COROLLARY 5.2. No return within the main program may target
the initialization code.
Hence, as long as the Branch Monitor can correctly mediate
all immediate branches corresponding to subroutine calls and all
indirect branch instructions within the main program, the call return
18Half-word alignment for branch instruction target addresses is enforced by the hard-
ware itself.
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matching performed by the Branch Monitor enforces that no control-
flow transfers to outside the main program occur as a result of
mediated calls. □
We evaluated the effectiveness of our Branch Monitor imple-
mentation by attempting to corrupt control-flow data on the stack
through a buffer overflow introduced into our sample binaries. We
also performed simulations where we corrupted the target addresses
kept in memory or registers for different branch types (both calls
and returns) in a debugger. In each case, we observed the Branch
Monitor detecting and preventing the compromised control flow.
5.2 Performance Considerations
On Cortex-M processors a bl instruction typically takes a single
cycle + a pipeline refill ranging between 1 – 3 cycles to execute
depending on the alignment and width of the target instruction as
well as the result of branch prediction. A subroutine return via a
bx lr has a comparable cycle count, while a return through a pop
{..., pc} costs an additional cycle per register to be loaded19.
As a result of the instrumentation, all aforementioned instructions
have been eliminated from the program image, and redirected to the
Branch Monitor where the additional validations and shadow stack
update takes place. Therefore our instrumentation will increase the
runtime cost (cycle count) of a branch severalfold. Subroutine calls
additionally incur the cost of the branch table lookup to resolve the
target of the call. The runtime cost of the lookup has a logarithmic
relation to the size of the branch table.
The overhead CaRE adds to program execution is dependent on
the number of subroutine calls and returns in the program. We evalu-
ated the impact of CaRE on performance using microbenchmarks
with varying proportions of subroutine calls (and returns) in relation
to other instructions. Our microbenchmarks consisted of an event-
based One-Time Password (OTP) generation algorithm that uses
the Corrected Block Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XXTEA) block
cipher algorithm, and a Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) implementation using the SHA256 cryptographic hash
function. The size of the branch table was kept constant for each
experiment. Our microbenchmarks contain only direct subroutine
calls and all indirect branches corresponded to effective returns.
We also instrumented the Dhrystone 2.1 benchmark program [50]
in order to estimate the performance impact on larger pieces of soft-
ware. Dhrystone is a synthetic systems programming benchmark
used for processor and compiler performance measurement. It is
designed to reflect actual programming practice in systems program-
ming by modeling the distribution of different types of high-level
language statements, operators, operand types and locality sourced
from contemporary systems programming statistics. In particular,
it attempts to reflect good programming practice by ensuring that
the number of subroutine calls is not too low. Today Dhrystone has
largely been supplanted by more complex benchmarks such as SPEC
CPU bencmarks20 and CoreMark21. The SPEC CPU benchmarks in
particular have been used in prior CFI literature [3, 13]. However,
the SPEC suite is not practical to port to MCUs cores. The support
library accompanying the Dhrystone benchmark contains both direct
19http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0439b/
CHDDIGAC.html
20https://www.spec.org/benchmarks.html
21http://www.eembc.org/coremark/about.php
and indirect subroutine calls, and indirect returns. Other types of
indirect branches were not observed in the main program portion of
the samples. We followed the guidelines in ARM application notes
on Dhrystone benchmarking for ARM Cortex Processors [1].
All measurements were performed on an ARM Versatile Express
Cortex-M Prototyping System MPS2+ FPGA configured as a Cortex-
M23 processor executing at 25MHz. Table 5 shows the results of
the microbenchmarks and Table 6 shows the result for the Dhrys-
tone benchmarks. According to the measurements the overhead of
CaRE ranges between 13% – 513%. The results compare favorably
to existing software protection based shadow stack schemes with
reported overheads ranging between 101% - 4400% [11, 20] (see
Section 7).
5.3 Memory Considerations
While layout preserving instrumentation does not add instructions to
the program image, the Branch Monitor and the constructed branch
and call target tables and need to be placed in device memory. The
Branch Monitor only needs to include the logic to handle branch
variants present for a particular program image. For our microbench-
mark program image the Branch Monitor implementation adds a
fixed 700 bytes (5.1%) to the program image size. The branch ta-
ble for the microbenchmarks program binary consists of 75 8-byte
records, adding 600 bytes (4.3%) to the program image. Overall the
memory consumption of our microbenchmark program increased by
9.4%. For out Dhrystone program image the Branch Monitor adds
Branch Monitor 1143 bytes (5.5%) and the branch and call target
tables 1528 bytes (7.3%) and 376 bytes (1.7 %). Overall the memory
consumption of the Dhrystone program increated by 14.5%). The
numbers for the Dhrystone program include full instrumentation of
the support library.
6 EXTENSIONS
Function-Reuse Attacks. The call target validation as presented
in Section 4 does address issue of complete function reuse attacks
within the main program code. An attacker might perform a pointer
substitution where a pointer to one subroutine is exchanged for
another subroutine. As both constitute valid call targets, the control-
flow transfer would be allowed. Our instrumentation tools allow a
human analyst to reduce the set of subroutines that may be subsi-
tituted for each other by limiting the entries to the call target table
known to be targeted by indirect subroutine calls, e.g. subrutines used
as callback functions. However, as the call target may be computed
by the program only at runtime, it is impractical to programatically
fully explore all possible execution paths of a program during static
analysis and pre-compute a complete CFG. This remains an open
problem for any CFI scheme.
Threading. In our current implementation, the normal state soft-
ware is limited to using the Main stack. In order to enable CFI for
the rudimentary threading supported by Cortex-M processors, the
Branch Monitor must be extended to maintain a separate shadow
stack for return addresses on the Process call stack. The changes to
the Branch Monitor are straightforward as it can consult the spsel
register to determine which shadow stack to update.
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Table 5: Microbenchmark results. "Monitor traps" shows the number of Branch Monitor invocations during the execution of the
microbenchmark routine. "Ratio" shows the ratio of instrumented control-flow transfer instructions in relation to other machine
code instructions in the main program image.
Program Monitor traps Ratio Uninstrumented Instrumented Overhead
otp 4 1956 0.53 ms 0.59 ms 0.07 ms (13%)
hmac 80 1588.4 0.02 ms 0.09 ms 0.07 ms (369%)
Table 6: Dhrystone results. The "One run through Drystone" column shows the average runtime through the Dhrystone benchmark
for the "Uninstrumented" and "Instrumented" program versions respectively.
Monitor Ratio One run through Drystonetraps Uninstrumented Instrumented Overhead
34 126.4 0.15 ms 0.76 ms 0.61 ms (513%)
On-device instrumentation. The layout-preserving instrumenta-
tion approach described in Section 4.3 has properties that make it
suitable for performing binary rewriting on-device. Firstly, since it
does not affect addresses resolved at link-time, it can be completed
in a single pass over the binary image. Secondly, the logic consists of
a simple search and replace of branch instruction patterns and branch
table construction. While our current implementation relies on an
separate tool for rewriting, it is straighforward to implement the
needed instrumentation as part of the installation process on-device.
Binary patching. Another approach to performing the instrumen-
tation required for CFI is Binary patching [6]. In binary patching,
instrumented instructions are replaced with dispatch instructions to
trampolines that are placed in unused memory. Compared to binary
rewriting [28], binary patching does not require adjusting of all pc-
relative offsets thanks to minimal impact to the program memory
layout. However, as explained in Section 2, Thumb-2 code has prop-
erties that makes binary patching more challenging compared to the
instrumentation approach described in Section 4.3; dispatch instruc-
tions used for ARM binary patching are typically 32-bit Thumb-2
pc-relative branches in order to encode a sufficient offset to reach
the trampolines. If the instrumented instruction a 16-bit Thumb in-
struction, the 32-bit dispatch cannot be inserted without affecting
the memory layout of the binary. Instead of adjusting all subsequent
instructions, both the 16-bit target instruction, and another (16-bit
or 32-bit) is moved to the trampoline to make room for the dispatch
instruction. If the moved instruction contains a pc-relative operation,
it needs to be adjusted accordingly since the new location of the in-
struction will have a different pc value. Even for a small instruction
set such as Thumb, the required logic to perform such adjustments
is not in general practical to be implemented as part of the software
update mechanism on a resource constrained device. Additionally,
as trampolines may contain instructions moved from the instrumen-
tation point, each instrumentation point requires a corresponding
trampoline. However, for use cases where on-device instrumentation
may not be a concern, a TZ-M protected shadow stack could be uti-
lized with binary patching. This approach would have the advantage
of not requiring Branch Monitor logic in the supervisor call handler.
7 RELATED WORK
Code-reuse attack countermeasures have been a focal topic of re-
search for the past decade. The most widely used mitigation tech-
nique against this class of attack is Address Space Layout Random-
ization (ASLR) [12, 36]), which is deployed by major operating
systems today 22 23 24. ASLR relies on shuffling the executable
(and the stack and heap) base address around in virtual memory,
thus requiring an attacker to successfully guess the location of the
target code (or data). This makes ASLR impractical for constrained
devices that lack MMUs and where memory is a scarce resource.
Dang et.al. [13] conduct a comprehensive evaluation of shadow
stacks schemes in the face of different adversarial models. Dang
et al.’s parallel shadow stack [13] and many traditional shadow
stacks [25, 26, 40] are based on unprotected shadow stacks, e.g.,
their integrity can be compromised if the shadow stack location is
known as they are located in the same address space as the vulnera-
ble application. Shadow stacks protected by canary values [20, 45]
can withstand attack that are limited to sequantial writes, but not
arbitrary writes to specific memory addresses. Dang et al. identify
only two schemes that operate under an equivalent adversary model
as CaRE, in particular with regard to the ability to withstand disclo-
sure of the shadow stacks location; Chiueh and Hsu’s Read-Only
RAD [11] and Abadi et al.’s CFI scheme [3]. Read-Only RAD incurs
a substantial overhead in the order of 1900% – 4400% according to
benchmarks by the authors. Abadi et al.’s protected shadow stack
achieves a modest overhead between 5% – 55% (21% on average).
However, it makes use of x86 memory segments, a hardware feature
not available on low-end MCUs. In contrast, CaRE provides equiva-
lent security guarantees without requiring hardware features unique
to high-end general purpose processors and compared to previous
work on software-only protected shadow stacks, CaRE performs
better.
In addition, we consider an even stronger adversary who can ex-
ploit interrupt handling to undermine CFI protection; this has been
largely ignored in previous CFI works. Prior work, most notably
22https://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/strategy/default.aspx#!section_3_3
23https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
24https://web.archive.org/web/20120104020714/http://www.apple.com/macosx/
whats-new/features.html#security
12
ROPDefender [16] and PICFI [42] support software exception han-
dling, particularly C++ exceptions. To the best of our knowledge,
CaRE is the first scheme to protect hardware interrupts initiated by
the CPU, a necessity for CFI in bare-metal programs. We make no
claim regarding software exceptions, as our system model assumes
C programs.
The prevalence of ROP and JOP exploitation techniques in run-
time attacks on modern PC platforms has also prompted processor
manufacturers to provide hardware support for CFI enforcement. In
June 2016, Intel announced its Control-flow Enforcement Technol-
ogy [31] that adds support for shadow call stacks and indirect call
validation to the x86/x84 instruction set architecture. Similarly the
ARMv8.3-A architecture provides Pointer Authentication (PAC) [46]
instructions for ARM application processors that can be leveraged
in the implementation of memory corruption countermeasures such
as stack protection and CFI. Countermeasures suitable for resource-
constrained embedded devices, however, have received far less atten-
tion to date. Kumar et al. [35] propose a software-hardware co-design
for the AVR family of microcontrollers that places control-flow data
to a separate safe-stack in protected memory. Francillon et al. [22]
propose a similar hardware architecture in which the safe-stack is
accessible only to return and call instructions. AVRAND by Pas-
trana et al. [44] constitutes a software-based defense against code
reuse attacks for AVR devices. HAFIX [15] is a hardware-based CFI
solution for the Intel Siskiyou Peak and SPARC embedded system
architectures.
8 CONCLUSION
Security is paramount for the safe and reliable operation of con-
nected IoT devices. It is only a matter of time before the attacks
against the IoT device evolve from very simple attacks such as tar-
geting default passwords to advanced exploitation techniques such
as code-reuse attacks. The introduction of lightweight trust anchors
(such as TrustZone-M) to constrained IoT devices will enable the
deployment of more advanced security mechanisms on these devices.
We show why and how a well understood CFI technique needs to be
adapted to low-end IoT devices in order to improve their resilience
against advanced attacks. Leveraging hardware assisted security
is an important enabler in CaRE, but it also meets other require-
ments important for practical deployment on small devices, such
as interrupt-awareness, layout-preserving instrumentation and the
possibility for on-device instrumentation. For small, interrupt-driven
devices, the ability to ensure CFI in both interruptible code, as well
for the code executing in interrupt contexts is essential.
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APPENDIX A EXCERPT OF BRANCH MONITOR CODE
1 #define STATE_BIT (0x00000001U)
2 #define IS_EXC_RETURN(addr) ((unsigned int)(addr) > (unsigned int)0xF0000000)
3
4 void SVC_Handler(void) /* supervisor exception handler entry point */
5 {
6 __asm( /* inline assembler trampoline to branch monitor */
7 "mrs r0, msp\n" /* pass pointer to Main stack top as first argument */
8 "b Branch_Monitor_main" /* invoke main branch monitor routine */
9 )
10 }
11
12 void Branch_Monitor_main(unsigned int* svc_args)
13 {
14 unsigned int svc_number; /* svc comment field number */
15 unsigned int stored_lr; /* pointer to lr stored on stack */
16 /* Stack frame contains: r0, r1, r2, r3, r12, r14 (lr), pc and xpsr
17 * - r0 = svc_args[0] <- offset from top of stack
18 * - r1 = svc_args[1]
19 * - r2 = svc_args[2]
20 * - r3 = svc_args[3]
21 * - r12 = svc_args[4]
22 * - lr = svc_args[5]
23 * - pc = svc_args[6]
24 * - xpsr = svc_args[7] */
25 svc_number = ((char *)svc_args[6])[-2]; /* read comment field from svc instr */
26
27 switch(svc_number)
28 {
29 case BL_IMM: /* branch with link (immediate) */
30 svc_args[5] = svc_args[6] | STATE_BIT; /* lr = next_instr_addr<31:1> : '1'; */
31 Secure_ShdwStk_Push(svc_args[5]); /* push ret address on shadow stack */
32 svc_args[6] = btbl_bsearch(svc_args[6]); /* branch table lookup for dest addr */
33 goto out;
34 case BX_LR: /* branch and exchange (lr) */
35 if (IS_EXC_RETURN(svc_args[5]) { /* exception return via bx lr */
36 stored_lr = svc_args[5]; /* lr stored in stack context */
37 svc_args[6] = (uint32_t)(&ret_bx_lr) & ~(0x00000001U);
38 goto return_through_trampoline; /* bx lr trampoline */
39 } /* fast track bybassing trampoline */
40 if (svc_args[5] != Secure_ShdwStk_Pop()) /* validate return address on stack */
41 { abort(); } /* halt on return address mismatch */
42 svc_args[6] = svc_args[5] & ~(STATE_BIT); /* pc = lr<31:1> : '0'; */
43 goto out;
44 case POP_R4_PC: /* pop r4, pc */
45 /* Stack frame additionally contains:
46 * - r4 = svc_args[8]
47 * - lr = svc_args[9] */
48 stored_lr = svc_args[9]; /* set pointer to stored lr */
49 svc_args[6] = (uint32_t)(&ret_pop_r4_pc) & ~(STATE_BIT);
50 goto return_through_trampoline; /* pop {r4,pc} trampoline */
51 case POP_R4_R5_PC: /* pop {r4,r5,pc} */
52 /* Stack frame additionally contains:
53 * - r4 = svc_args[9]
54 * - r5 = svc_args[10]
55 * - lr = svc_args[11] */
56 stored_lr = svc_args[11]; /* set pointer to stored lr */
57 svc_args[6] = (uint32_t)&ret_pop_r4_r5_pc & ~(STATE_BIT);
58 goto return_through_trampoline /* pop {r4,r5,pc} trampoline */
59 /* ... */ /* addl. cases omitted for brewity */
60 return_through_trampoline:
61 if (stored_lr == Secure_ShdwStk_Pop())
62 { goto out; } /* validate return address on stack */
63 default:
64 abort(); /* unrecognized svc number */
65 out:
66 return; /* return to trampoline / call dest. */
67 }
15
